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HOW MUCH PROCESS IS DUE: THE SENATE
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL PROCESS AFTER
NIXON v. UNITED STATES
Article I of the United States Constitution confers on the Senate the
sole power to try officials impeached by the House of Representatives.'
The Senate Rules of Procedure and Practice2 permit the Senate to ap-
point a committee of peers to conduct impeachment trials and to report
its findings of fact to the full Senate for final determination.3 The Com-
mittee's role is not to make a recommendation to acquit or convict, but
rather to serve as a fact-finding body that provides each senator with suf-
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6. The provisions authorizing im-
peachment are presented in both Articles I and II of the Constitution. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5;
id art. I, § 3, cl. 6-7; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. Article I provides the House of Representa-
tives with the "sole power of impeachment" and the Senate with the "sole power to try"
those impeached. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
Section 4 of Article II of the Constitution subjects the "President, Vice President and all
civil officials" to the impeachment process for any "treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors" committed. Id. art. II, § 4; see THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that this provision subjects Article III
judges, as civil officers, to the impeachment process); cf Robert S. Catz, Removal of Fed-
eral Judges by Imprisonment, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 103, 104-05 (1986) (discussing removal of
judges by imprisonment after conviction as an alternative form of removal to impeach-
ment); Stewart A. Block, Comment, The Limitations of Article III on the Proposed Judicial
Removal Machinery: S. 1506, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1064 (1970) (discussing a proposal to
establish a method for the removal of judges within the judicial branch as an alternative
method for removal through the legislative impeachment powers).
This Comment focuses specifically on the impeachment of judges, who are subject to the
process more frequently than other officials and are voicing their concerns to the judicial
branch more actively. See infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. Of the fourteen Sen-
ate impeachment trials held, eleven involved federal judges. See infra note 33 (listing the
eight judges tried by the Senate prior to the Senate trials of Judges Claiborne, Hastings and
Nixon during the 1980s). It is likely that many of the judges' concerns would apply to
executive branch officials because the Constitution's construction subjects all civil officers
to impeachment. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, cl. 1 (subjecting the President, Vice President
and all civil officers to removal by impeachment). This issue, however, is beyond the scope
of this Comment.
2. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING IN IMPEACH-
MENT TRIALS, Rule XI, reprinted in REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE ON
THE ARTICLE AGAINST JUDGE ALCEE L. HASTINGS, S. REP. No. 156, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(addendum C) (1989) [hereinafter Rule X1].
3. Id. The committee "shall report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the
transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before such committee." Id.
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ficient information to make an individual determination regarding an of-
ficial's guilt or innocence.4
Congressional impeachment procedures have generated many constitu-
tional concerns,5 including debate over the constitutionality of using a
Senate trial committee. 6 Central to this debate is whether the use of the
twelve-senator committee to conduct the Senate impeachment trial vio-
lates the constitutional requirement that the Senate "try" all impeach-
ments,7 as well as the Constitution's Due Process Clause.8 Judges
Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon, impeached under this trial process dur-
ing the 1980s,9 believed that a trial by anything less than a full Senate
4. Id.; see also REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
AND REMOVAL 51-52 (1993) (explaining and evaluating the role and procedures of the
Senate impeachment trial committee) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. Congress estab-
lished the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal pursuant the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5122 (1990) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (Supp. V 1993)). Former Congressman Robert W. Kas-
tenmeier and Michael J. Remington, Esq. served as Chairman and Director, respectively,
of the Commission.
5. See infra note 10 (discussing other constitutional issues raised by the impeachment
process).
6. See Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490, 492 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated and
remanded, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993), dismissed on remand, 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.
1993) [hereinafter Hastings I]; see also Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (test-
ing the constitutionality of using a Senate committee during congressional impeachment
procedures).
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
8. Id. amend. V, § 3. Debate also exists as to whether the due process standard can
be applied to the impeachment process at all, regardless of justiciability, if impeachment is
not considered a criminal proceeding. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal Impeachment and
Criminal Procedure: The Framers' Intent, 52 MD. L. REV. 437, 438 (1993).
9. The Senate did not use the committee process until Judge Claiborne's trial in 1986.
See generally COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE,
S. REP. No. 511, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (first report filed by a Senate impeachment
committee). Judge Claiborne was impeached and removed from office for the "high
crimes and misdemeanors" of willfully and knowingly falsifying his personal income tax
returns over a number of years. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF
JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, H. REP. No. 688, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1986) (stating
the grounds for impeachment).
Judge Hastings, a judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
was impeached and removed from office for "the high crimes and misdemeanors" of con-
spiring to reduce jail sentences in return for $150,000 and for perjuring himself while a
witness at his own criminal trial. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, H.. REP. No. 810, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1988). Judge Walter
Nixon, a U.S. District Court Judge for the Southern District of Mississippi, was impeached
for jeopardizing the integrity of the court by perjuring himself before a grand jury that
investigated his handling of a drug smuggling trial involving the son of a personal friend.
135 CONG. REC. S14,634-36 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1989). Both Judges Claiborne and Nixon
were convicted in judicial courts prior to their impeachments. United States v. Nixon, 816
F.2d 1022, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming a jury trial conviction), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1026 (1988); United States v. Claiborne, 765 F.2d 784, 805 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming a jury
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violated their due process rights."0 To voice their concerns, these judges
brought actions in federal court expecting the judicial branch to resolve
this debate by holding the current Senate trial process unconstitutional. 1
However, in 1993 the Supreme Court, in Nixon v. United States,' 2 held
that the constitutionality of Senate procedure, including the use of a trial
committee, is a political question and, therefore, non-justiciable. 3 Thus,
without the Court's clear determination regarding the constitutionality of
conviction), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986). Judge Hastings, however, was acquitted in a
jury trial prior to his impeachment. Although outside the scope of this article, it is of
interest to note that Judge Hastings unsuccessfully argued that his impeachment subse-
quent to acquittal was also unconstitutional. Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. at 500-01.
The Senate enacted Rule XI, the provision creating the option of using a committee for
impeachment trials, in 1935. Daniel Luchsinger, Note, Committee Impeachment Trials: The
Best Solution?, 80 GEo. L.J. 163, 169 (1991). The provision is permissible under Article 1,
Section 5 of the Constitution which provides that each house of Congress will enact its own
rules of procedure. See generally Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (holding
that Congress' constitutional authority includes the power to create its own procedural
rules).
10. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736; Hastings I, 802 F. Supp. at 500; see also Claiborne, 765
F.2d 784. The due process violation was one of the central arguments made by Judges
Nixon and Hastings during their efforts to have their impeachment convictions reversed by
the judiciary. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735-39; Hastings I, 802 F. Supp. at 500. See infra notes
58-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of their efforts. Other procedural issues
debated include whether the decrease in the income of impeached judges, which results
from their hefty legal fees, violates the constitutional provision requiring that a federal
judge's income never be decreased; whether a judge already criminally convicted also can
be impeached without violating the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution; and
whether the Constitution requires the impeachment process to precede a judicial proceed-
ing. See Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. at 500-01. This Comment is limited to discussing the issue
of the legitimacy of the Senate trial-by-committee process used in the most recent trials
during the 1980s. See id. (arguing that the trial process is unconstitutional).
11. Judge Hastings brought three separate cases at different stages during the im-
peachment process. See Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated and remanded,
988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993), dismissed on remand, 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1993); Has-
tings v. United States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 887 F.2d 332 (D.C. Cir.
1989); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986). Judge Nixon's case culminated in the Supreme Court's
decision in Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
12. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
13. Id. at 738-40. The terms "political question" and "non-justiciable" were defined
extensively by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 209-37 (1962). The
Court found that in determining whether a question is a political one, courts should focus
on whether designating the question to a political department is appropriate and whether a
"lack of satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination" exists. Id. at 210. The Court
additionally held that a political question is nonjusticiable under the function of the separa-
tion of powers. Id.; see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (discussing the definitions
of these terms).
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the Senate procedure, the debate continues as to whether the use of an
impeachment trial committee is the most equitable procedure available.
14
The debate involves striking a balance between maintaining an equita-
ble process for individuals who are subject to an impeachment trial and
the significant time constraints such a process might impose on the Sen-
ate.15 To address these factors effectively, it is necessary to consider what
the framers intended when they granted the Senate the power to try
impeachments.
16
This Comment first reviews the development of the Senate's current
impeachment process, focusing specifically on the impeachment of
judges. In particular, this Comment explains the enactment of the Senate
trial-by-committee process and reviews the role of the Senate trial com-
mittee during the three impeachment trials in which it was utilized. This
Comment then discusses the specific concerns presented by the trial-by-
committee process as analyzed in Nixon v. United States, 17 and evaluates
the impact of the Court's reasoning that the impeachment process is non-
justiciable under the political question doctrine. Despite the Court's
holding, this Comment finds that any trial procedure that the Senate uses
should, in fairness to the impeached parties, satisfy the due process stan-
dard. Further, this Comment tests the trial-by-committee process and de-
termines that the current process not only satisfies the Constitution's due
process requirement, but, in light of severe time constraints on today's
Senate, is necessary as the most efficacious process available.
Finally, this Comment reviews various recommendations and alterna-
tives for reform, including those recently suggested by the National Com-
mission on Judicial Discipline and Removal.18 While this Comment
14. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing the criticisms that several
experts have made since the 1980s).
15. See, e.g., Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 738-40; Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. at 503-05; Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. i
(1989) (discussing, in an historical context, the complexities of the impeachment process in
both houses of Congress, as well as recently proposed alternatives); Robert S. Peck, Jurist
before the Bench: Challenging Impeachment Procedures for Federal Judges, 79 A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1993, at 56 (reviewing the history of Judge Nixon's impeachment and acknowledging
the need for procedural reform); Luchsinger, supra note 9 (opposing the Senate's current
trial-by-committee process); see also infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text (discussing
the due process test as presented in Mathews v. Eldridge).
16. Specifically, the question is whether the framers intended the impeachment trial
process to include a trial by the entire Senate, as those in favor of the due process argu-
ment claim, or whether the lack of detail in the Constitution indicates that the Senate has
the power to delegate this power to a smaller Senate body, or even to another branch of
government. Hastings I, 802 F. Supp. at 501-05.
17. 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
18. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4 (evaluating the current process
and outlining its recommendations for reform).
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determines that no reform is needed for due process purposes, it con-
cludes that certain recommended measures may effectively increase effi-
ciency in the Senate impeachment process.
I. IMPEACHMENT TRIAL PROCEDURE
A. The Development of Congressional Impeachment Power-The
Framers' Intent
The framers constructed the Constitution's impeachment provisions to
ensure that the impeachment process serves as a check on the power of
both the judicial and executive branches.19 In discussing the rationale for
granting the impeachment power to Congress, Alexander Hamilton
called the impeachment process a "national inquest" and found that
Members of Congress, as representatives of the people, would serve as
the best judges of officials during a national inquiry.20 In his words, no
body other than the Senate would be "sufficiently independent" nor have
the "confidence" and "necessary impartiality" to responsibly impeach
other officials. 2'
The framers included a number of procedural requirements for the im-
peachment process in the Constitution. In addition to granting the House
the sole power to impeach22 and the Senate the sole power to try23 those
impeached, the Constitution explicitly requires that senators be under
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 29 (discussing the importance to the framers of
creating an independent process to serve as a further check and balance on the branches
during impeachment). See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional
Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 Ky. L.J. 707 (1987-88) (focusing specifically on the
framers' intent when drafting the provisions regarding who is subject to impeachments, the
sanctions available, and what offenses are impeachable).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). The best "inquisitors for the nation [are] the representatives of the nation them-
selves." Id. In Federalist Paper No. 65, Alexander Hamilton analyzed the benefits of
granting the impeachment trial power to the Senate, as well as the arguments for granting
the power to either of the other two branches of government and concluded that the grant
of power to the Senate represented the most democratic approach for an impeachment
trial. Id.; see also Melissa H. Maxman, Note, In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Im-
peachment Standard, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 420, 434-38 (1987) (advocating the constitutional
interpretation that the drafters' intention that impeachment be the sole method of removal
for judges is but one more example of the balancing of powers between the branches).
21. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Hamilton reached his determination about the role of the Senate trial, in part, by
ruling out an alternative plan to use the Supreme Court. Id. He found that the Supreme
Court could not be relied on as having the fortitude, degree of credit, or the authority
necessary for the task. Id. Hamilton, instead, thought that the trial body'should be more
numerous and less restricted by the rules of a judicial court. Id. at 398-400.
22. U.S. CONST. art. .I, § 2, cl. 5.
23. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Catholic University Law Review
oath while sitting for trial proceedings; 24 that a conviction occur by only a
two-thirds majority vote of senators present;25 and, that the removal from
office and the disqualification from holding any other federal office rep-
resent the most extreme penalties for conviction.26 Aside from these pro-
visions and a few additional provisions not relevant here, the
impeachment process, including the use of the trial-by-committee pro-
cess, is left to the discretion of Congress.27
Debate over the Senate trials during the drafting of the Constitution
addressed many of the same concerns that today's critics voice.28 Some
concerns centered on the notion that giving the Senate the power to try
impeached parties would be contrary to the separation of powers doc-
trine because it would grant the Senate judicial-type powers.29 In defense
of the proposed Senate authority, Hamilton wrote that the "partial inter-
mixture" of departments is necessary in this case as "an essential check in




26. Id.; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 28-29. The provision regarding avail-
able penalties for conviction of an impeachment indicates explicitly that, although the pun-
ishments are limited, the person still may be subject to indictment, trial, conviction, and
penalty by a judicial court. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
27. Some experts believe that "[tihe gap that is left as to the rest of the specifics of the
Senate's trial is to be filled according to the discretion of the Senate, as provided in article
I, section 5 that '[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.' " Gerhardt,
supra note 15, at 94 (footnote omitted); see also Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 746
(1993) (White, J., concurring) (discussing the constitutional basis for leaving it within the
Senate's discretion for determining procedure); 132 CONG. REC. S15,767 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
1986) (statement of Sen. Specter) (stating that "[tihe Constitution does not dictate the
manner in which the trial shall be conducted . . . .The Senate thus has the authority to
fashion rules that govern" the impeachment trial process).
28. See Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 737-39; Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 11-18 (discussing the
framers' debate over the Senate impeachment trial process); infra notes 100-04 and accom-
panying text (discussing whether the framers intended the use of trial committees).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 401-02 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
30. Id. Hamilton further explained that the impeachment power provisions, in combi-
nation with the Senate's confirmation power provision, are among the best examples of
balancing governmental powers. Id. He added that both the requirement that the House
impeach prior to a Senate trial and the Appointments Clause, which requires the President
to nominate appointees whom the Senate must confirm, limit the Senate's impeachment
and confirmation powers. Id.
In fact, the grant of the power of appointments to the Senate, in addition to the impeach-
ment trial power, provides for one solution to the current criticisms of the impeachment
process. See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
greater scrutiny by the Senate during the appointment process to avoid selecting unquali-
fied and unworthy judges).
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B. The Procedure and Problems Associated with the Senate
Trial Committee
Impeachment trials, judicial or otherwise, do not occur frequently.
3'
Since the drafting of the Constitution, the Senate has tried eleven judges,
and only seven have been convicted. 32 Eight of these trials occurred
prior to 1937 before a full Senate-prior to the Senate's creation of the
trial-by-committee process. 33 Some of these impeachment trials were
lengthy processes and marked by low Senate attendance. 34 In response,
the Senate enacted Rule XI, which is a procedural rule that provides the
Senate with the option of using a trial committee made up of twelve
senators.35
If the Senate decides to try by committee, rather than by full Senate,
Rule XI, as enacted by the Senate, requires that the trial committee pre-
pare a complete transcript of the impeachment proceedings, including all
testimony before the Committee.36 The full Senate then makes its final
31. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 29.
32. Id. at 29-30. Of these, three trials and convictions (Judges Claiborne, Hastings,
and Nixon) occurred in a three year period from 1986-1989; these three occurred after a
fifty year gap during which there were no judicial impeachment trials. Id.
33. As noted by the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, the
eight judges were:
John Pickering, U.S. District Judge for the District of New Hampshire (1803-
1804); Samuel Chase, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court
(1804-1805); James Peck, U.S. District Judge for the District of Missouri (1826-
1831); West H. Humphreys, U.S. District Judge for the District of Tennessee
(1862);... Charles Swayne, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Flor-
ida (1903-1905); Robert Archbald, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, then serving as Associate Judge of the U.S. Commerce Court
(1912-1913); Harold Louderback, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of
California (1932-1933); Halsted Ritter, U.S. District Judge for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida (1936).
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 29-30.
34. For example, in 1933, the impeachment proceedings against Judge Harold
Louderback took 76 days. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51; see also Bruce Fein &
William B. Reynolds, Judges on Trial: Improving Impeachment, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 30,
1989, at 24 (discussing the length of early impeachment trials among the reasons for reform
of process). In addition to the time factor, attendance by the full Senate was low, as sena-
tors complained that the trial interfered with their legislative duties. COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 52; see also David 0. Stewart, Impeachment by Ignorance, 76 A.B.A. J.,
June 1990, at 52 (reviewing the history of the impeachment process as part of an argument
for reform). In fact, at the 1913 impeachment trial of Judge Robert Archbald, attendance
rarely "topped 20 of the 94 Senators then in office, and .... [v]ery few senators ...
attended consistently." Peck, supra note 15, at 58.
35. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51; see Rule XI, supra note 2 (providing the
Senate with the option of appointing 12 of its members to a trial committee). See infra
note 36 for the partial text of Rule XI.
36. Specifically, Rule XI provides that:
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judgment relying primarily on its review of this transcript. 37 Rule XI also
requires that the trial committee call the accused to appear during the
trial.38 The Rule limits the scope of the trial to the articles of impeach-
ment or the specific charges brought by the House of Representatives. 39
Further, the Committee must refer all dispositive motions made by the
parties-that is, all decisions that might deprive the full Senate of its con-
stitutional duty to make a final judgment 4°-to the full Senate for deter-
mination.41 Although the Committee has substantial fact-finding
authority, the Committee has no authority to make conclusions 42 or to
recommend the acquittal or conviction of the individual. 3 Instead, the
Committee provides each senator with an impartial report that includes a
The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in writing a certified copy
of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given before such
committee, and such report shall be received by the Senate and the evidence so
received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and pur-
poses, subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and
materiality, as having been received and taken before the Senate, but nothing
herein shall prevent the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testi-
mony in open Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in open
Senate.
Rule XI, supra note 2.
37. Id.; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51-52.
38. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 50 (stating that the Senate must call the
accused to appear before it).
39. Rule XI, supra note 2; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 50 (stating
that "[t]he Senate's jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed by the case brought before it by
the House"). The impeachment procedure in the House and Senate is analogous to the
judicial process of a grand jury indictment followed by a trial which is limited by the scope
of the indictment. See Rose Auslander, Impeaching the Senate's Use of Trial Committees,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 68, 74 (1992); Melton, supra note 8, at 447-48 (discussing the analogy
between congressional impeachment procedure and grand jury procedures).
40. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 52. Any evidentiary or other ruling that
might affect the full Senate's final determination of guilt or innocence must be referred to
the full Senate for decision. Id.
41. Rule XI, supra note 2; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 52; see also infra text
accompanying note 112 (discussing the requirement that, to prevent any final judgments by
the trial committee, dispositive motions be referred to the full Senate).
42. See infra text accompanying note 110-11.
43. REPORT OF THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITITEE ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST
JUDGE ALCEE HASTINGS, S. REP. No. 156, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1986) [hereinafter
HASTINGS TRIAL REPORT]; see also Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 186 (analogizing the cur-
rent process to the trial by master process in the courts). In his article Luchsinger argues
that the current process is unconstitutional because the accused is deprived of a hearing
before a full Senate, but that an amendment to allow the trial committee to make an initial
recommendation to the full Senate would be one step toward making the Senate trial-by-
committee process acceptable. Id. at 186-87.
When drafting Rule XI, the senators initially granted the committee the authority to
make recommendations to the Senate regarding the accused's guilt or innocence, but this
provision was eliminated because the Senate did not want the committee's authority to
supersede the requirement for a full Senate debate. Id. at 187.
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complete transcript of the trial committee's hearings, and also gives the
full Senate the opportunity to view videotapes of the proceedings. 44 Af-
ter reviewing these materials, the full Senate determines whether it will
hear any witnesses.45 The full Senate then holds a debate and votes.
46
After the Senate first appointed and used a trial committee in 1986,
concerns developed over whether the process violated the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.47 Under the Due Process test presented by
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,48 a court must evaluate the
procedure or law that allegedly jeopardizes an individual's right to life,
liberty, or property by balancing the private interests affected by the offi-
cial action against the importance of the official action in question.49 The
standard is satisfied if a court finds that there is no available alternative to
the official action in question and that the burden on the private interests
is not unduly severe.5"
The due process claims at issue arise specifically from the concern that
erroneous deprivation of judgeships result from the trial committee pro-
44. See Rule XI, supra note 2, at 51; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51; Has-
tings v. United States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D.D.C. 1989) (discussing the trial com-
mittee's responsibility to report impartially to the full Senate).
45. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 52.
46. Id.
47. Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 163-64. The Due Process Clause requires that govern-
ment actions against a person's life, liberty, or property be procedurally fair. JOHN E.
NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13.8, at 483-84 (3d ed. 1986). Specifically, the
clause states that an individual may not be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The courts historically defined the term prop-
erty broadly to include public employment. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (holding that the Ohio statute in question created a
property right for civil service employees); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03
(1972) (holding that a de facto tenure program can give rise to a property interest in a
professorship position), overruled as stated in Board of Trustees v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp.
472 (D.D.C. 1991). Although the courts have never held that the impeachment process is
subject to the due process requirement, most experts agree that the expectation of a life-
time tenure in a judgeship amounts to a property right under the clause. See, e.g, COMMiS-
SION REPORT, supra note 4, at 131-33 (Sen. Heflin's separate statement). "Federal judges
have ... a property right to their jobs, and that right warrants due process protections." Id.
at 131; see also Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 180-81 (stating that a federal judgeship meets
the recently expanded definition of property under the Due Process Clause).
48. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
49. Id. at 335. Specifically, a procedure of law will meet the due process standard if it
balances "[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail." Id. (cita-
tion omitted); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 132 (Sen. Heflin's separate
statement) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
50. Cf. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348-49.
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ceedings: specifically, from the decisions of eighty-eight senators who do
not view the trial directly;5' the lack of attendance, even by the commit-
tee members;52 and from the inadequate time given by the full Senate in
its consideration.53 Furthermore, critics argue that the availability of a
full transcript for review is not a satisfactory alternative to a full Senate
trial.54
Some experts also believe that statistics collected after the three 1980s
impeachment trials lend credence to their argument that the inability of
senators to hear testimony directly during the impeachment trial-by-com-
mittee violates due process principles.55 The argument is that by denying
51. Plaintiff's Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 33, Hastings v. United
States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1989) (No. 89-1602) [hereinafter Hastings Com-
plaint] (complaint from an earlier suit stating that the Senate's use of a committee deprives
the accused of his due process rights because each Senator fails to devote the appropriate
time during the trial). In his complaint, Judge Hastings argued that "[t]he Constitution
imposes upon every Senator the duty to serve as both judge and juror, and those responsi-
bilities cannot be properly delegated" to a trial committee. Id.; see also Nixon v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (mentioning similar arguments made by Judge Nixon);
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 132 (Sen. Heflin's separate statement); Luchsinger,
supra note 9, at 182.
52. In his experience on the 1986 committee for Judge Claiborne's impeachment trial,
Senator Howell Heflin (D-AL) was frustrated by the committee's poor attendance.
Howell T. Heflin, The Impeachment Process: Modernizing an Archaic System, 71 JUDICA-
TURE 123, 124 (1987) [hereinafter The Impeachment Process]. A quorum of seven senators
is required, but, according to Heflin, this is unsatisfactory in comparison to the require-
ments of a jury trial before a judicial court. Id. Senator Heflin remarked, "[h]ow can a
United States Senator carry out his constitutionally mandated impeachment responsibili-
ties if he does not participate in either the committee hearing or have an opportunity to
gain knowledge of the case from a full trial on the Senate floor?" Id.
53. 132 CONG. REC. S15762 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (statement of Sen. Bingaman).
Although Senator Bingaman supported the Senate's procedure during the trial of Judge
Claiborne, he voiced concern over the adequacy of the full Senate's debate in making its
final determination. Id.; see also Hastings Complaint, supra note 51, at 33 (detailing Has-
tings' arguments against a committee trial).
54. The Impeachment Process, supra note 52, at 124. According to Stewart's argu-
ment, the framers of the Constitution granted the Senate the impeachment trial power to
have a "more numerous" body as the audience and thus intended that the impeachment
trial take place before a full Senate. Stewart, supra note 34, at 52. In keeping with the
framers' intent, some argue that any burden associated with the trial by the full Senate
should be overcome, particularly in light of the infrequency of impeachment trials. See id.
at 52-55; see also Hastings Complaint, supra note 51 (arguing that the Senate should sus-
pend legislation to devote the necessary time and attention).
55. Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. at 502; Stewart, supra note 34, at 52; Luchsinger, supra
note 9, at 182. For example, prior to the use of the committee, only 50% of impeached
judges tried were convicted. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 29-30. In comparison,
all three of the judges recently subject to the trial-by-committee process were convicted.
Id.; Stewart, supra note 34, at 52, 54. Furthermore commentators argue that a greater
proportion of senators on the committee voted to acquit than the senators who did not
hear the testimony directly. See Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. at 492 (arguing this point before
the district court). In Judge Nixon's case before the United States District Court for the
1994] Nixon v. United States
the judges the right to present their cases before the full Senate, they also
are deprived of procedural due process.56 Specifically, these commenta-
tors theorize that the trial-by-committee process "allows the majority of
Senators to vote on an impeachment without hearing evidence first-
hand.""
C. The Impact of Nixon v. United States on the Senate Trial Process
1. Bringing the Judges' Concerns before the Courts: Nixon v. United
States
Judge Hastings began raising his constitutional concerns in court even
before the completion of his own impeachment trial.58 The courts in both
his case and Judge Nixon's addressed whether the cases were nonjusticia-
ble under the political question doctrine.59 The Supreme Court explained
the test for whether a controversy presents a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion in Baker v. Carr.6' There, the Court held that a controversy is non-
justiciable where (1) there is textual evidence61 that the Constitution has
committed to a particular political department the issue in controversy or
District of Columbia Court, one of the judges hearing the case admitted that, given the
conviction statistics prior to the use of the committee process, the Senate might not have
convicted Judge Nixon if all of the senators heard the evidence directly. Garry Sturgess,
Sympathetic Ear for Impeached Judge, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 20, 1990, at 7. Sturgess cites
Judge Oberdorfer's opinion in the district court's decision in Nixon v. United States in
which Judge Oberdorfer found that the failure of two-thirds of the trial committee mem-
bers to vote for Judge Nixon's conviction indicated that if the full Senate had heard the
testimony directly it would have voted to acquit. Despite Judge Oberdorfer's findings, the
district court never reached the merits of the case. Id.; see also Nixon v. United States, 744
F. Supp. 9, 14 (D.D.C. 1990) (discussing the difference between the ways judges and juries
try facts), aff'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
56. For example, one critic, David Stewart, concludes that "[b]y preventing the ac-
cused from effectively presenting his case to all senators, the committee trial denies the
accused a fair opportunity to defend himself." Stewart, supra note 34, at 54.
57. Auslander, supra note 39, at 78.
58. See Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 770 F.2d 1093, 1094
(1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986); Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1992); Has-
tings v. United States Senate, 716 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D.D.C.) (brought by both Judges Has-
tings and Nixon), aff'd 887 F.2d 332 (1989).
59. See Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. at 493-98. Judge Sporkin found that Judge Hastings'
case was justiciable, but the case was later dismissed as a result of the Supreme Court's
holding in Nixon. See Hastings v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1993); see also
Nixon, 744 F. Supp. at 13 (holding the judge's constitutional claim against the Senate im-
peachment process nonjusticiable).
60. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker v. Carr, the Court found that issues relating to
redistricting are not political questions and are, therefore, justiciable. Id. at 237.
61. Specifically, a "textual commitment" is present when the Constitution has assigned
the determination of a question to a body other than the courts. GERALD GUNTHER, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 397 (1 1th ed. 1985); NOWAK, supra note 47, § 2.15(d), at 109-10.
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(2) where there is "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it."
62
Judge Nixon argued in his case that the Baker test was not met and that
his complaint was justiciable under the Supreme Court's holding in Pow-
ell v. McCormack.63 In Powell, the Supreme Court held that the House
of Representatives' decision to exclude a duly elected member was justi-
ciable. 4 The Powell Court determined that any expulsion of a Member
of Congress arising from the Constitution's explicit provision regarding
removal65 is reviewable by the Court. 6 Likewise, any of the House's ef-
forts to expel on other grounds, such as those in Powell,6 7 are not political
questions and are reviewable.68
After persistent and lengthy efforts on the part of both Judges Hastings
and Nixon,69 the Supreme Court decided without dissent in Nixon that
the constitutionality of the Senate's impeachment process is a political
question and thus, is nonjusticiable.7° The Supreme Court examined the
62. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 176-80. In his 1992
article, Luchsinger analyzed the trial-by-committee process under the Baker test for jus-
ticiability and wrote that "[nione of [the] barriers to the merits are present when evaluat-
ing" this process. Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 176. In 1993, the Supreme Court held
otherwise. See infra note 69-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
holding in Nixon v. United States).
63. See Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 739 (1993) (discussing Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)).
64. Powell, 395 U.S. at 549.
65. The constitutional provisions at issue in Powell were Article I, Section 5, which
provides Congress with the authority to review the qualifications of its Members, and Arti-
cle I, Section 2, which specifically presents the only qualifications necessary for member-
ship in the House. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1; id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1-2; see Powell, 395 U.S. at
493, 521.
66. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739-40 (discussing the Powell Court's decision in relation to
the Nixon holding); Powell, 395 U.S. at 493, 521.
67. Powell, 395 U.S. at 522. Specifically, the Powell Court held that the House is
limited under Article 1, Section 5 to a review of the qualifications and expulsion provisions
presented by the Constitution in Article I, Section 2. Id. Also, because of the Constitu-
tion's "textual commitment" to the House, any of the House's efforts to expel one of its
Members on these or other grounds (as presented in Powell) is justiciable. Id.
68. Id.
69. See supra notes 58-59 (listing the judicial proceedings brought by Judges Hastings
and Nixon).
70. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740 (Stevens, J., White, J., Blackmun, J., and Souter, J., con-
curring). After his Senate conviction, Judge Nixon brought this action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment and reinstatement,
arguing that the procedure under the Senate's Rule XI is unconstitutional because it does
not provide for a trial by the full Senate. Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C.
1990), aff'd, 938 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). In addition to
resolving Nixon's concerns, the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon effectively halted Judge
Hastings' judicial efforts as well. Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated and
remanded, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993), dismissed on remand, 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.).
1994] Nixon v. United States
Constitution's Impeachment Clause71 and noted the specificity of the re-
quirements within it.72 Regarding the first sentence of the Impeachment
Clause, which provides the Senate with the "sole power to try,"7 3 the
Supreme Court held that this phrase is not only " 'a textually demonstra-
ble constitutional commitment'" of impeachment power to the Con-
gress,74 but also that it lacked "sufficient precision to afford any judicially
manageable standard of review."75
The Court also reviewed and rejected Judge Nixon's argument that the
Constitution's use of the word "try, 76 is a limited constitutional grant and
is therefore justiciable under Powell.7 7 The Court analyzed the definition
of the term "try" and concluded that it is not so specific in meaning as to
require the Senate to perform this duty in a particular manner. 78 Con-
trary to Nixon's argument, the Court additionally held that the use of the
term "sole" in Article I, section 3, clause 6 amounts to a textually demon-
strable commitment of the power to try impeachments to the Senate."
71. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 6.
72. Specifically, the Court outlined the requirements of the Constitution, including the
requirements that the Senate must: (1) take an oath; (2) convict by a two-thirds majority;
and (3) have the Chief Justice sit when trying the President. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735-36.
73. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
74. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 735 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). In
making the determination that the Senate trial procedure is nonjusticiable, Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, noted that the analysis of what amounts to a textually de-
monstrable constitutional commitment is not separate from, but rather relates to, the
analysis of what is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable for resolving it. Id.; see
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 103-04 (1973). Berger
quoted Professor Herbert Wechsler, a supporter of the nonjusticiability of impeachment:
" 'Who ...would contend that the civil courts may properly review a judgment of im-
peachment when [the Constitution] declares that the 'sole power to try' is in the Senate?
That any proper trial of an impeachment may present issues of the most important consti-
tutional dimension ... is simply immaterial ......."Id. Berger, however, personally found
that the trial process should be appealable to the Supreme Court when constitutional viola-
tions arise. Id. at 111-12.
75. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736.
76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. "The Senate shall have the sole power to try all
impeachments." Id. (emphasis added).
77. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736.
78. Id. Specifically, the Court determined that the term "try" does not require the
Senate to try the impeached party in the same manner as a judicial court. Id. Thus, the
Court held that the meaning of "try" is not so specific as to provide the Court with a
judicially discoverable and manageable standard for resolving whether the Senate's
method of trial by committee is unconstitutional. Id.
79. Id. The Court reviewed the dictionary meaning of the word "sole": " 'having no
companion,' 'solitary,' 'being the only one,' and 'functioning ... independently and without
assistance or interference.'" Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIc-
TIONARY 2168 (1971)). The Court held that, given those definitions, it is difficult to argue
that the Senate would have "sole" power if its decision was judicially reviewed. Id. Specif-
ically, the Court wrote that "[i]f the courts may review the actions of the Senate in order to
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Finally, the Court further found its analysis consistent with the framers'
intent and held that if the framers envisioned judicial review, they would
have explicitly stated so.80 The Nixon Court reasoned that judicial review
was inconsistent with the framers' intention that the impeachment pro-
cess serve as a check on the judicial branch and that criminal trials and
impeachment trials be handled by separate bodies.
8 1
2. The Issue of Fairness is Left in the Hands of the Senate
The Supreme Court's holding in Nixon, precluding judicial review of
the Senate trial procedure, prevents any judicial evaluation of the funda-
mental fairness of the impeachment trial-by-committee process. 82 Un-
derlying the Court's holding, however, is the issue of what standard of
fairness, if any, the Senate should impose on itself.83 As a result of
Nixon, the Senate is free to establish its own impeachment process, as
long as the process does not violate a specific constitutional restriction
within the impeachment clause.84 Congress demonstrated an interest in
the issue of fairness prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon by
determine whether that body 'tried' an impeached official, it is difficult to see how the
Senate would be 'functioning ... independently and without assistance or interference.'"
Id.
80. Id. at 737-38.
81. Id. at 738. Additionally, Justice Souter stated, in his concurrence, that judicial
review should occur only where "governmental order" is threatened. Id. at 748 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
82. Thus, in light of Nixon, and as evidence of the finality of the courts' jurisdiction
over the issue of fairness in the impeachment trial process, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded the holding of United
States District Court in Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490 (1992), that the trial-by-
committee process violates the judge's due process rights. Hastings v. United States, 988
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir.), dismissed on remand, 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1993).
Although the Nixon majority did not reach the merits of the case, Justice White, in his
concurrence, did reach them and found-in opposition to the district court in Hastings-
the Senate process to be constitutional. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740-47 (White, J., concurring);
see infra notes 100-04 (discussing in detail Justice White's concurrence).
83. In holding Nixon's claim non-justiciable, the Supreme Court wrote that "[judicial
involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if only for purposes of judicial review, is
counterintuitive." Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 739. Thus, the procedural questions are left to the
Senate's own determination. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 53-54; see BERGER,
supra note 74, at 120 (stating that if the impeachment process is not reviewable, it must at
least yield to due process).
84. See Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Essay on the Removal
of Federal Judges, 76 Ky. L.J. 643, 675-77 (1988). For example, if the Senate were to try
the President without the Chief Justice presiding, as required by Article I, Section 3,
Clause 6 of the Constitution, the conviction would be reviewable by the Supreme Court
under its holding in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). As the Nixon Court wrote,
a case is reviewable if Congress extends its procedural bounds beyond those established by
the Constitution. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740.
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creating the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal
(National Commission) to review all issues relating to the subject of judi-
cial discipline.85
II. ANALYSIS OF THE SENATE TRIAL-BY-COMMITTEE PROCESS IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The Due Process Clause mandates that the Senate consider standards
of fairness so that its trial proceedings are conducted with uniformity and
consistency. It simply requires that when a government action jeopar-
dizes a person's life, liberty, or property, the government action in ques-
tion must be conducted fairly. 6 Although many, including the
proponents of the full Senate trial, believe that the Due Process Clause
always requires the right to a hearing,87 constitutional scholars have
found that the Due Process Clause requires only fair procedures, not nec-
essarily a hearing.8"
85. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5122 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (Supp. V 1993)). With regard to the impeachment trial
process, the Commission acknowledged, in its final report, the current Senate debate over
the issue of whether to apply the Due Process Clause to impeachment trials and, if so, what
procedures are necessary to meet the standards of this clause. COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 4, at 53-54. The Commission encourages continued debate by the senators on the
issue of fairness and concludes that, as a "collegial institution," the senators will determine
the best procedures for impeachment trials. Id.
86. U.S. CONST. amend V; BERGER, supra note 74, at 120 ("'Due process' has been
epitomized ...as the 'protection of the individual against arbitrary action.' " (quoting
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 302 (1937))); NOWAK, supra note
47, § 13.8.
87. See NOWAK, supra note 47, § 13.2 (discussing this common belief); see also Nixon,
113 S. Ct. at 737 (discussing Nixon's argument that the trial-by-coinmittee process violates
due process by not affording the entire Senate the opportunity to testimony); Hastings I,
802 F. Supp. at 504-05 (arguing that the fundamental constitutional concept of due process
demands trial by full Senate).
88. NOWAK, supra note 47, § 13.8. Meeting the due process standard does not mean
that the Senate is bound in its trial to meet the procedural requirements of a traditional
judicial trial. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 736. In analyzing the fairness of the current Senate trial
process, it should not be compared to the procedure used in a criminal or civil trial. Aus-
lander, supra note 39, at 96-98. There are obvious differences in its procedure. The Senate
is not bound by the federal rules of evidence, by a particular standard of proof, by a re-
quirement that the factfinders view witnesses directly or by a requirement to hold a trial by
jury. And, in any event, those rules may not be necessary for the Senate to meet the
fairness requirements of due process. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 745-46 (White, J., concurring);
see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 53-54 (acknowledging the current debate over
what procedures are needed, if any, to meet the due process requirements).
Even some of those who believe the trial-by-committee process is justiciable and viola-
tive of due process concede that the impeachment process is sui generis-neither criminal
nor civil in nature. Auslander, supra note 39, at 74 (citing Hastings v. United States Sen-
ate, 716 F. Supp. 38, 41 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 887 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1989)); see Rotunda, supra
note 19, at 719-20 (discussing standard of proof issues and the difference between the im-
1994]
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The test presented in Mathews v. Eldridge8 9 is the typical method for
determining whether a procedure is fundamentally fair.90 For due pro-
cess purposes, the Senate trial-by-committee process must be weighed
and analyzed under the factors enunciated in Mathews.91 Analyzing the
impeachment trial process by using the Mathews factors involves a weigh-
ing of whether the judge's right to a property interest, a judgeship, might
be erroneously deprived by the trial-by-committee process and whether
any alternative procedures exist that might protect that right.92 If such
peachment process and judicial procedures). See generally Melton, supra note 8, at 456-57
(discussing the framers' intent that the impeachment process not be considered a criminal
proceeding). Judge Sporkin, who held that the Senate trial-by-committee violated Judge
Hastings' due process rights, stated that "[t]here is no reason to believe that the full pano-
ply of due process protections that apply to a trial by an Article III court necessarily apply
to every proceeding. Impeachment trials are unique and are entitled to be carried out
using procedures that benefit their special nature." Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. at 504. How-
ever, Judge Sporkin held that the Senate process still must be conducted under the basic
principles of due process. Id.; see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 53-55 (discussing
the differences between impeachment trials and criminal trials).
89. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see infra notes 90-166 and accompanying text (discussing the
Mathews test for due process, which balances the individual's life, liberty, and property
rights against the importance of the government's interest, and applying test to the Senate
trial procedure).
90. NOWAK, supra note 47, § 13.8, at 491 (citing Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981);
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), as examples of Mathew's
application); see also Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 181-82 (using the Mathews test in deter-
mining the validity of the Senate process).
At least one author has found that the Mathews test is inappropriate when applied to the
impeachment trial process because, she argues, the test is used only to determine if a trial is
necessary at all, not to determine if the trial is fair. Auslander, supra note 39, at 91. How-
ever, experts support the argument that the Mathews test is appropriate not only in deter-
mining whether a trial is required, but also as a method of determining the precise hearing
procedures. NOWAK, supra 47, § 13.8.
91. The test presented in Mathews weighs the following factors: (1) the private inter-
est that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requisites would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
92. See id. at 335; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 132 (Sen. Heflin's separate
statement); Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 181. This Comment does not discuss the first
factor of the Mathews test because it concurs in the finding that there is a private interest at
stake and that the determination that a lifetime judgeship amounts to a property right
under the Due Process Clause, as determined by several Supreme Court decisions. See
supra note 47 and accompanying text (listing cases supporting the principle that guaran-
teed public employment amounts to a property right); see also NOWAK, supra note 47,
§ 13.5 (d), at 479 (stating that "[i]f the government gives the employee assurances of con-
tinual employment . . . then, there must be a fair procedure to protect the employee's
interests").
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alternatives exist, it must be determined how burdensome they would be
on the Senate.
93
The analysis below finds that, given all of these factors, the current
Senate procedure is fundamentally fair.94
A. The Trial-by-Committee Process Does Not Erroneously Deprive
Judges of Their Right to Life Tenure
1. The Trial-by-Committee Process is Consistent with the Framers'
Intent
Judges recently subjected to the Senate impeachment process argue
that trial-by-committee is unfair. Specifically, these judges contend that
the only way a senator would be able to cast an informed vote on im-
peachment is if they personally witnessed the hearing in a full Senate
trial.9" For this argument to prevail, however, the judges must show that
the framers' use of the word "try" was, in effect, a restriction preventing
the Senate's reliance on a fact-finding committee.96 A review of the
framers' intent when drafting the Impeachment Clause refutes this
contention.97
The fact that the framers delegated the trial process to the Senate at all
may be evidence that they sought to avoid the traditional trial process.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Nixon, the framers specifically
sought a trial by the Senate rather than by the judiciary.9 The goal of
such a designation may have been not to replicate the efficiency of the
judicial court, but rather to make the process more democratic by placing
it with the Senate.
99
93. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 132 (Sen.
Heflin's separate statement); Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 181.
94. Yet, some authors have analyzed the committee trial process against the Mathews
test and found that it does not satisfy the due process test. See, e.g., Luchsinger, supra note
9, at 181. In his article, Luchsinger opined that a judge's property interest, i.e., his judge-
ship, is unduly deprived by the substantial risk that the judge will be erroneously removed
during a process in which 88 senators do not view any direct testimony. Id.
95. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 734-35 (1993); Hastings 1, 802 F. Supp. 490,
502 (D.D.C. 1992); Hastings Complaint, supra note 51, at 32-33.
96. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 740-47 (White, J., concurring). In fact, however, Justice White
held, in his concurrence in Nixon, that the Senate trial committee process was justiciable
and, on the merits, found that the framers intended flexibility where they used the word
"try." Id. at 745; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. (using the word "try" in giving the
Senate impeachment trial authority).
97. See, e.g., Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 745-46 (White, J., concurring) (holding that the cur-
rent process meets due process standards, in part, because of its consistency with the fram-
ers' intent).
98. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 738-39.
99. See infra note 150 and accompanying text (indicating that the framers did not in-
tend to create an efficient process, but rather a flexible one).
19941
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In fact, the framers encouraged flexibility in the process.'00 The fram-
ers felt that severe procedural limitations should not burden the Senate
trial process. 1° 1 Additional evidence suggests that some framers intended
that the Senate use a committee process similar to the method used by
England's House of Lords-' a committee for the fact-finding portion of
the trial.' 02 Finally, the Constitution grants the authority to each house of
Congress to create self-governing rules and procedures.10 3 There is no
evidence that this provision does not apply to the impeachment process,
as well as to Congress' other procedures. 0 4
2. Trial-by-Committee is Practical and Fair in Light of the Modern
Senate
At least one senator argued that the Senate's workload and time con-
straints have rendered the framers' intentions that the Senate determine
its own procedure outdated, impractical, and unfair. 105 There is signifi-
cant evidence available, however, that the Senate trial process-and the
trial-by-committee-remains fair and practical, especially in light of the
modern Senate's workload. 06 The framers probably did not envision a
100. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 746 (White, J., concurring) (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, A
MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE U.S. § LIII
(2d ed. 1812)).
101. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers that the process can never be
"tied down by... strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or
in the construction of it by the judges." THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Notably, the Nixon Court referred to Justice Story
who, when analyzing the Impeachment Clause, once said that there is a difference in a
judicial court proceeding, where strict rules are necessary in order to protect the accused,
and an impeachment trial, in which strict rules are unnecessary and, in fact, ill-suited for
such a trial of a political nature. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 746 (White, J., concurring).
102. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 745-46 (White, J., concurring) (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON, A
MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE U.S. § LIII
(2d ed. 1812), which discusses that the framers were aware that the House of Lords used a
fact-finding committee during impeachment trials).
103. U.S. CONsT. art I, § 5, cl. 2. The Constitution states that "Each House may deter-
mine the rules of its proceedings." Id.; see Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 746 (White, J., concurring).
104. Nixon, 113 S. Ct. at 746 (White, J., concurring) (reasoning that the formation of a
trial committee was nothing more than a determination by the Senate of its own trial
procedures).
105. See The Impeachment Process, supra note 52, at 125; COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 4, at 131 (separate statement by Senator Heflin) (arguing that the current trial by
committee process violates the Due Process Clause).
106. Burbank, supra note 84, at 650 (opposing a constitutional amendment to change
the impeachment process and defending the current impeachment process); see Maxman,
supra note 20, at 420 (arguing that the impeachment process, even with its complexities,
most effectively preserves judicial independence and impartiality in accordance with the
Constitution).
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Senate as large in number and in agenda as today's Senate, but the pro-
cess they created continues to be flexible. °7
The Senate's trial-by-committee process is an efficient and fair process
in which it is not necessary that every senator participate directly to cast
an informed vote. 108 The proceedings are broadcast live to every sena-
tor's office and are recorded on videotape for the senators' viewing.'0 9 In
addition, each senator receives a complete transcript of the proceed-
ings.110 Finally, the committee performs only a fact-finding role. It does
not make any recommendations and cannot alter any of the full Senate's
final determinations." 1 In fact, any dispositive motions brought before
the committee are forwarded to the full Senate for determination."
12
Some critics argue that the fact that a significant percentage of commit-
tee members voted to acquit the three judges who were most recently
convicted 13 is evidence that the other senators, who were not on the
committee and voted to convict, were uninformed." 4 This argument
does not consider the characteristic that distinguishes the Senate im-
peachment process from the judicial court system: a senator's individual
107. "[T]he framers crafted a process that has proved to be efficacious, durable, and
flexible: efficacious in that impeachment works; durable in that the process withstands the
test of time; and flexible in that a modern day impeachment can be molded to meet current
procedural and institutional pressures." Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington,
Judicial Discipline: A Legislative Perspective, 76 Ky. L.J. 763, 778 (1987-88); see also Nixon,
113 S. Ct. at 736 (" '[The Constitution speaks in general terms, leaving Congress to deal
with subsidiary matters of detail as the public interests and changing conditions may re-
quire' " (quoting Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921)).
108. Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 107, at 778; see also Burbank, supra note
84, at 687-88. Burbank correctly explains that those who doubt the constitutionality of the
committee process because there is no direct testimony to the Senate cannot rely on the
argument that the use of the word "Senate" in the Constitution's impeachment trial provi-
sion means full Senate. Id. Burbank analogizes, for example, that the grant to the
Supreme Court of original jurisdiction has been found to permit delegation of authority to
only one of the nine Justices in certain situations; and, secondly, that the framers, such as
Thomas Jefferson, actually contemplated the use of a committee such as the current one.
Id.
109. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51; see supra notes 36-46 and accompanying
text (discussing Senate Rule XI and the Senate trial-by-committee process).
110. Rule XI, supra note 2; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51.
111. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51; see supra text accompanying notes 36-
46 (discussing Senate Rule XI and the Senate trial-by-committee process).
112. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51-52; see also Mitch McConnell, Reflec-
tions on the Senate's Role in the Judicial Impeachment Process and Proposals for Change,
76 Ky. L.J. 739, 743 (1987-88) (discussing the limits on Senate committee authority).
113. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the trial committee mem-
bers' votes in the three recent trials).
114. Id.
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decision is not required to be based on a particular standard of proof." 5
Unlike established evidentiary standards in criminal and civil courts, sen-
ators are not guided by any standard.116 Their decisions are based on
their individual evaluations of the evidence.' 17 The delineation between
those senators who voted to acquit and those who voted to convict does
not indicate conclusively a lack of knowledge by certain senators because
there is no required evidentiary burden." 8 Rather, it also may indicate
that each senator considered the evidence and formulated a judgment,
without the aid of a standard-of-proof guideline.119
The benefit of using a trial-by-committee process is that it enables the
Senate to focus on its legislative duties and impeachment duties simulta-
neously. Prior to the use of a trial-by-committee process, impeachment
trials by the full Senate could take as long as seventy-six days to com-
plete. 2° Under the burden of a full Senate trial, it is unlikely that the
senators also would be able to consider the several thousand legislative
measures introduced in each Congress. 2 ' Moreover, the trial-by-com-
mittee process still ensures a fair and efficient process for the parties on
trial.' 22 In fact, the three trials using the trial-by-committee process were
115. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59-60; see also David Johnston, Hastings
Ousted as U.S. Judge by Senate Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1989, at Al (acknowledging the
lack of a uniform standard of proof).
116. Evidence in criminal cases must indicate guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" for a
judge or jury to convict and evidence in civil cases must indicate guilt by either a prepon-
derance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence, depending on the charge.
PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 11 (1988) (noting the differences
between civil and criminal trials and explaining the necessity that a person's guilt be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction in a criminal trial); see MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 755 (1983) (discuss-
ing the varying burdens of proof and production and defining the terms "preponderance of
the evidence" and "clear and convincing" as "resting between more probably true than not
true"); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59-60 (discussing what, if any, stan-
dard should be established by the Senate); infra note 197 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the standard of proof issue).
117. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59-60.
118. Id.
119. See infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Senate
should adopt a standard of proof to aid the committee process).
120. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51 (discussing Judge Louderback's hearing
and the length of the trials prior to enactment of Rule XI); see also supra note 34 (further
discussing the full Senate process).
121. The number of legislative measures-bills, amendments, and resolutions-intro-
duced during the 102d Congress totaled 16,398. J. Craig Crawford, Capitol Hill: Who
Wields a Big Stick?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 1993, at Al, A19.
122. See Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 167-70 (discussing the rationale for the Senate
enactment of Rule XI).
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efficient"2 3 and fair in the treatments of all the parties.12 4 The Senate
report filed by the Hastings Impeachment Committee confirms that each
party was given equal time to present their cases and "[n]either party was
denied the opportunity to call a witness because of the unavailability of
tine."125
B. The Alternatives to the Trial-by-Committee Process are
Unduly Burdensome
1. Trial by the Full Senate is Unduly Burdensome and More Unfair
than the Trial-by-Committee
In the two most recent impeachment proceedings, Judge Hastings and
Judge Nixon argued that the entire Senate should suspend legislative and
executive business so that senators could devote the necessary time and
attention to the impeachment proceedings.1"6 Indeed, a full Senate hear-
ing appears plausible given that there have been only eleven judicial im-
peachment trials by the Senate in a two-hundred-year period.
127
Considering, however, that of those hearings, the three most recent were
held over the course of a three-year period, 28 that at least one potential
impeachment is currently pending, 129 and that the number of federal
123. The three trials averaged 10 days in length and even Judge Nixon's attorney did
not question the time frame of the trial process. Stewart, supra note 34, at 55 (arguing that
the short time frame in fact makes it possible to conduct a full Senate trial).
124. See, e.g., HASTINGS TRIAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 165-72 (summarizing the
procedures taken by the trial committee to ensure that all parties and witnesses testify);
Jack Brooks et al., Justice for Judges, and the 'National Inquest,' LEGAL TIMES, May 6,
1991, at 28-29 (arguing that the entire proceedings against Hastings were fair).
125. HASTINGS TRIAL REPORT, supra note 43, at 170 (stating that the parties in the
Hastings trial were given a total of 80 hours to present their cases). As one senator also
recognized after the Claiborne trial, the Senate has an immense burden in the impeach-
ment process, but the "[Senate's Special Impeachment] Committee saved countless hours
of the full Senate's time and exerted tremendous influence on the Senate's ultimate deci-
sion." McConnell, supra note 112, at 760.
126. Hastings Complaint, supra note 51, at 33. David Stewart, the attorney who repre-
sented Judge Nixon before the Senate and the courts, similarly argued that because im-
peachment trials are not an everyday occurrence and that the experience of the committee
trials is a task that can be performed in a short period of time, the Senate should suspend
their other activities for a full Senate trial. Stewart, supra note 34, at 55. Despite the three
trials during the late 1980s, Stewart states that impeachment trials occur, on average, one in
every 13 years. Id.
127. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 29.
128. Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon were impeached and removed between
1986 and 1989. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the grounds for im-
peachments for each judge); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 30 (discussing
the grounds of all parties impeached, tried and convicted).
129. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 36. Among the judges currently awaiting
possible impeachment is U.S. District Court Judge Robert Aguilar. See Fellow Judges Let
Aguilar Return to Bench, THE S.F. CHRONICLE, May 20, 1994, at B3. Aguilar's case is
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judges is increasing, 130 impeachment trials may become a more common
occurrence. 131
In fact, a full Senate trial would result in low attendance, thereby mak-
ing the quality of the deliberations more unfair than the trial-by-commit-
tee process.132 The Senate enacted Rule XI because, even in the early
1900s, senators realized the impracticality and unfairness of a trial by the
entire Senate.' 33 Thus, given the larger and more active Senate of the
1990s, it is unlikely that attendance 134 or efficiency 35 at a full Senate trial
would be any better than it was in 1935.136
particularly similar to Judge Hastings case in that an appellate court found him innocent of
criminal charges that he leaked a wire tap and obstructed a grand jury investigation. Id.
Congress has not yet decided whether to initiate impeachment proceedings. Id.
130. There are currently 842 federal judges with lifetime tenure; in 1936, there were 224
such judges. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at ii.
131. See id.
132. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the low attendance prior to
the enactment of Rule XI in the 1930s). But see Stewart, supra note 34, at 55 (arguing that
impeachments are infrequent enough to warrant the extra effort on the part of the Senate
for a full trial).
133. Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 167-69. At the Louderback impeachment in 1933,
there were only three senators in the chambers at one point. Id. Prior to the enactment of
Rule Xl, Senate impeachment trials were conducted on the Senate floor before a full Sen-
ate and even then, when the Senate was not as large in number nor its agenda as full,
attendance was lacking. Id. In a 1913 impeachment trial, "attendance ... rarely topped 20
of the 94 senators then in office." Peck, supra note 15, at 58; see also Auslander, supra
note 39, at 97. Even Auslander, who argues that the current trial process violates due
process, concedes that the full Senate would need to correct its attendance record to meet
the due process standard that she applies. Id.
134. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51. Even though all 100 senators today
still do not hear all of the testimony directly, it is arguable that access to videotapes, trial
transcripts and committee reports, in fact allow senators today to be more informed than
the senators burdened with a full Senate trial in the 1930s. See notes 37-46 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Rule XI and the full Senate's access to evidentiary materials).
135. Despite the argument that a full Senate trial would be more inefficient than the
committee process, lawyers for the most recently impeached judges argued before the
courts that a full Senate trial would not be too time consuming or burdensome. Stewart,
supra note 34, at 55. But cf. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 51 (noting that the 1935
full Senate trial of Judge Louderback lasted 76 days); see also supra note 34 (discussing the
Senate procedure prior to the enactment of Rule XI).
136. One reason that the trial by committee is time-efficient may be that not all 100
senators are active participants in the fact-finding process. If there were full attendance
and participation, for example, in the fact-finding process, the length of the trial process
could become unduly burdensome on the Senate. This presents an interesting "catch 22"
where the desire for full attendance may increase the length and inefficiency of the trial
process. But see Stewart, supra note 34, at 55 (implying that the full Senate could complete
a trial in the same amount of time as the trial committee).
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2. Recommended Alternatives to Senate Impeachment Are Contrary
to the Separation of Powers Notion of the Constitution
Several alternatives have been proposed that would provide for a
speedier removal, either by an automatic removal procedure or by per-
mitting the Senate to delegate its removal powers to another branch of
government. 137 There are two types of proposals that present particular
concerns. One proposal would penalize a federal judge convicted of a
felony by automatically suspending him or her from office.138 A second
proposal would grant the judicial branch the authority to police its
peers. 139 Advocates of judicial branch self-policing are unconcerned that
such a plan would undercut judicial independence, arguing instead that
the courts are equally concerned with this issue.1 40 Their argument sup-
137. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 158 (discussing several alternative
proposals).
138. Id. (discussing the legislative proposal of Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC)). A
separate but related debate exists regarding the co-existence and timing of the impeach-
ment process in relation to the criminal prosecution process. Some argue that criminal
indictments, convictions, and imprisonment should not be made prior to the impeachment
of government officials because such judicial actions amount to removal from office and
are thus contrary to the Constitution's provisions. Analysis of this debate is, however,
beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 77-82 (pro-
viding a general discussion of the co-existence of judicial action and impeachment action).
139. There are actually several such proposals. One proposal would grant the Supreme
Court, or a federal judicial tribunal, the authority to discipline judges with removal from
office or a reduction in pay. Burbank, supra note 84, at 695 & n.248 (discussing Sen.
DeConcini's proposal, S.J. RES. 370, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)).
Others would permit such discipline for judges who bring "'disrepute on the Federal
Courts or the administration of justice by the courts' " or alternatively would grant a judi-
cial tribunal appointed by the Chief Justice the authority to try cases initiated by the attor-
ney general. Burbank, supra, note 84, at 695 (quoting S.J. Res. 113, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (introduced by Sen. DeConcini)); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Politics and Pro-
gress in Implementing the Federal Judicial Discipline Act, 71 JUDICATURE 13 (1987-88)
[hereinafter Politics and Progress]; Fein & Reynolds, supra note 34, at 24-25; Burke Shar-
tel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some Possibilities Under
the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930) (discussing proposals for the removal of
judges by the courts); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 158-59 (Appendix I) (outlin-
ing statutory proposal to allow the courts disciplinary authority). A third proposal would
establish a bifurcated system in which a commission would investigate charges and act as a
grand jury and a "Court of the Judiciary" would have removal powers as a trial court. The
Impeachment Process, supra note 52, at 125; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 159
(separate statement of Sen. Heflin) (supporting a proposal under which the Senate would
appoint individuals to those bodies).
140. Shartel, supra note 139, at 876-77. Bruce Fein and William Reynolds note that
their proposal does not threaten judicial independence because
[n]either the legislative nor executive branch could compel removal of a judge for
alleged misconduct; that authority would be lodged solely within the federal judi-
ciary itself. Nor will iconoclastic judges need fear the ire of their brethren, for
two reasons: Initiation of charges would be in the hands of the attorney general,
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porting such procedures is that not only are the courts better equipped
than the Senate to try cases, but they also are more eager than the Senate
to discipline judges who do their profession a disservice. 14 1
Although the proposals suggesting alternatives to the Senate process
vary in technique, they all would provide the judicial branch with a signif-
icant, if not exclusive, role in the impeachment process.' 42 This notion
directly conflicts with the Constitution's explicit grant of impeachment
authority to Congress.'
43
The suggestion that judges could be removed from office by other
judges clashes with the framers' intention that Congress' power to im-
peach and remove serve as a "check" on the power of the judiciary 4 4 and
as a method for maintaining judicial independence. 145 The Constitution
also provides that the impeachment of an official does not preclude a
and the felony standard would sharply circumscribe the discretion of both the
prosecutor and the presiding judges in a removal proceeding.
Fein & Reynolds, supra note 34, at 25.
141. Shartel, supra note 139, at 875-76.
142. See supra notes 137-54 and accompanying text (outlining the proposals for judicial
involvement). Judicial involvement in the disciplinary process is not a new concept.
Through a congressional delegation of authority, The Judicial Councils, Reform, and Judi-
cial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c), the judicial branches' Judicial
Conference already plays a role in the impeachment process by screening complaints filed
against judges. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This role, however, is not the
only method by which a complaint may be filed, and in any event, is secondary to the role
of Congress because it has no authority to remove. See infra note 172 (further discussing
provisions of the 1980 Act).
143. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. The Constitution explic-
itly separated the criminal court process and the impeachment process. Id. In opposing an
early proposal to delegate impeachment powers to another branch of government, one
scholar of the process addressed the Constitution's use of the word "sole" in the Impeach-
ment Clause by stating that:
The Framers certainly would not have been so meticulous in the use of words, so
careful to use this particularly strong word in the vesting of the impeachment
power, unless they had in mind . . . to make it clear to all forever that. in the
American system, no significance should be given to [proposals] whereby the
power to charge misconduct for the purpose of obtaining removal of a civil officer
from office was held to be lodged in any other than that legislative body directly
representing the whole people.
Maxman, supra note 20, at 434 (quoting Merrill E. Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is it Consti-
tutional?, U. KANSAS CITY L, REV. 1, 25-26 (1939)).
144. Alexander Hamilton saw the need for flexibility during impeachment proceedings
and argued that such flexibility would be found only in a "numerous court" such as the
Senate and not in the traditional procedures of the judicial branch. THE FEDERALIST No.
65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also COMMISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 24 (arguing that automatic removal from office upon conviction
would eliminate the congressional check on improper prosecutorial targeting of judges).
145. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 18; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 65, 79 (Alexan-
der Hamilton); see also McConnell, supra note 112, at 751 (reiterating the importance of
protecting judges from overly aggressive discipline by their peers).
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criminal trial. 146 Alexander Hamilton saw this provision as further impe-
tus for the use of two different branches in the two trials so as to decrease
the risk that one verdict might influence the other.
147
Finally, the use of a federal tribunal or another judicial body to remove
judges also would conflict with the concept that removal is best per-
formed by the nations' representatives, as opposed to tribunal members
who would be un-elected and unaccountable to the U.S. citizens.1 48 The
impeachment process is, by design, a political one and will remain so only
in the hands of Congress.' 49 Congressional impeachment authority may
not foster optimum efficiency-an important concern to the officials im-
peached; but efficiency was not the motivating factor in the drafting of
the Constitution.' 50
In addition to the constitutional issues previously discussed, the propo-
sal that a judge be suspended from office pending impeachment upon a
felony conviction presents additional concerns. 15  It directly contradicts
the Constitution's provision that the penalty of removal from lifetime
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7; Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732, 738 (1993).
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 399 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Specifically, he promoted the "double security intended [impeached parties] by a
double trial" of both the Senate impeachment trial and the court criminal trial. Id.; BER-
GER, supra note 74, at 113-14.
148. THE FEDERALIST PAPER No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (stating that too much judicial authority in the impeachment process would con-
flict with the importance of accountability for those given the authority to impeach); see
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 24 (noting that a judicial body created to discipline
and remove federal judges would be non-elected and, at best, imperfectly accountable to
voters) see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of
using a "numerous body" such as the Senate in the impeachment process).
149. One critic opposed to an increase in judicial authority in the impeachment process
wrote that "Congress is the only governmental branch with any intrinsic checks on frivo-
lous or vindictive accusations" and that proposals to shift the authority to another branch
"neglect significant policy concerns in their attempt to respond rapidly to immediate polit-
ical pressures." Maxman, supra note 20, at 443, 450-51 (footnote omitted).
150. In fact, Senator Leahy stated during the Hastings trial that the process was "made
purposefully cumbersome to preserve the Constitution." Impeachment: Time to Change
the System?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1989, at A12; see also Maxman, supra note 20, at 447-48
(emphasizing the value of using a complex impeachment process). Consistent with this
notion, the court of appeals wrote in Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States,
770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 904 (1986), that " '[clonvenience and
efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government.' "
Id. at 1111 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)); see also Catz, supra note 1,
at 108 (stating that "the admittedly cumbersome process is claimed ... to be purposely
designed to prevent a whimsical assault on our judicial integrity").
151. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 12; Catz, supra note 1, at 106-07 (finding
that removal other than by impeachment is contrary to Constitutional intent); see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
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tenure for judges is reserved to the impeachment process. 15 2 In fact, re-
moval from office and disqualification from future federal positions are
the only penalties available to the Senate upon an impeachment convic-
tion.'5 3 Furthermore, a proposal for suspension without pay for a felony
conviction violates Article III of the Constitution, which explicitly ex-
empts impeachment trials from the trial-by-jury requirement because the
penalty imposed would be the result of a jury verdict.
514
3. A Constitutional Amendment Permitting Alternative Procedures
for Removing Judges Is Unduly Burdensome and
Unnecessary
Many proponents for change recognize the constitutional problems
that their alternatives present and, therefore, propose that they be
adopted through a constitutional amendment. 55 A constitutional
amendment would grant new power to the judicial branch, thereby upset-
ting the equilibrium between the three branches of government and po-
tentially weakening the independence of the judicial branch.'56 No
greater reason exists today than 200 years ago to increase the judiciary's
authority or to disrupt the balance between the three branches of govern-
ment.' 57 In addition to ignoring the Constitution's original intent,' en-
acting a constitutional amendment unduly burdens the current system.'
59
152. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7. "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office...
under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law." Id.
153. Id.; see also Catz, supra note 1, at 106-08 (reviewing the views of several histori-
ans, judges, and politicians that judges may only be removed from office upon impeach-
ment conviction).
154. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeach-
ment, shall be by jury..." Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 74, at 81 (noting that the
Constitution exempted impeachment from trial by jury).
155. The Impeachment Process, supra note 52, at 123. Supporting a constitutional
amendment, Senator Heflin wrote, "I have concluded that our current impeachment rules
were written for an era that has passed and a Congress that has changed." Id. What moti-
vates these proponents is that "[p]roceeding by way of constitutional amendment has the
distinct advantage of mooting arguments rooted in the decent obscurity of arrangements
framed two hundred years ago." Burbank, supra note 84, at 649.
156. Burbank, supra note 84, at 650.
157. Politics and Progress, supra note 139, at 22.
158. Id.; see also Burbank, supra note 84, at 649.
159. See Burbank, supra note 84, at 649-50 (cautioning those who propose constitu-
tional amendments to evaluate drastic alternatives before undertaking a change in the
Constitution); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 24.
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Few proposed amendments are adopted, 160 and the amendment process
is costly 161 and lengthy. 162
Thus, under the Mathews due process test, 63 of which its third prong
requires an analysis of any burdens presented by alternatives to the cur-
rent impeachment process, a constitutional amendment would introduce
an undue and unnecessary burden."6 Any amendment to the Constitu-
tion should be consistent with the original intent of the framers. 165 Shift-
ing authority between the branches of government threatens the clear
goal of the framers to create a balance of power between the three
branches of government.
166
III. REFORMING THE EXISTING PROCESS: ADDRESSING FAIRNESS
CONCERNS CONSISTENT WITH CONSTITUTIONAL INTENT
Nixon v. United States vests the Senate with the responsibility for deter-
mining what "complex machinery" is needed to ensure a fair impeach-
ment process. 67  Although the current trial-by-committee process
160. Between the year of the adoption of the Constitution and 1986, only 26 of approxi-
mately 5,000 proposed constitutional amendments have been added. Maxman, supra note
20, at 431 n.64.
161. Burbank, supra note 84, at 649.
No matter what the subject, the transaction costs of a constitutional amendment
are enormous, and they increase as the subject becomes more controversial.
... When the subject of a proposed constitutional amendment involves matters
that are basic to the operations of one branch of the federal government, transac-
tion costs are as nothing compared to the costs of potential error in treating a
polycentric problem as if it had only one dimension.
Id. (footnote omitted).
162. Fifty-seven years elapsed between the Thirteenth Amendment's first proposal and
its enactment. Maxman, supra note 20, at 431 n.64.
163. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Mathews test).
164. Burbank, supra note 84, at 696. "Constitutional amendment is ... an expensive
way to experiment with alternatives to current arrangements, and neither institutional self-
interest nor institutional power is a compelling argument for change when those arrange-
ments are designed to preserve the countervailing power of another institution." Id.
165. See Burbank, supra note 84, at 649-50. Change by constitutional amendment
should result from a "comparative assessment not just of current arrangements and pro-
posed alternatives under a new constitutional grant but also of adjustments that might be
made with fidelity to the provisions of the Constitution and thus without change to those
provisions." Id. at 650.
166. See id. at 649-50; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison) (discussing
the importance of separating the powers of government and creating checks and balances);
id. No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing how the impeachment process established in
the Constitution meets the "separation of powers" and "checks and balances" goals).
167. See supra notes 58-81 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of Nixon); see
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 54. One author wrote that the impeachment
authority
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satisfies the due process standard presented in Mathews, 68 the question
remains as to whether the current process can be improved to address
some of the critics' concerns over the trial-by-committee process.1 69
Prior to Nixon, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act t 70 in
1990 to create the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Re-
moval 7' which released its final report in late 1993.172 The final Coin-
is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional arsenal, but because it is so
heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It is like a hundred-ton gun which needs com-
plex machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge of power to fire it,
and a large mark to aim at.
JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 283 (1888).
168. This analysis indicates that the process is not only fair, but that its alternatives are
either unduly burdensome or unfair. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the due process test used to analyze the trial-by-committee process).
169. See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text (discussing the critics concerns).
170. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5122 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). The 1990 Act was subsequently amended with minor technical
changes and additional funding provisions. See Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1858 (1992);
Pub. L. No. 102-368, 106 Stat. 1118 (1992); Pub. L. No. 102-198, 105 Stat. 1623 (1991); Pub.
L. No. 102-27, 105 Stat. 136 (1991).
171. The Commission included 13 members appointed by the President Pro Tempore of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, the President and the Conference
of Chief Justices of the States. National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 411, 104 Stat. 5124, 5125 (1990).
172. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4. The purpose of the Commission was to
investigate problems and issues related to judicial discipline and removal, evaluate the ad-
visability of proposing alternatives, and submit its findings to Congress, the Chief Justice,
and the President. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5124-25 (1990). As the Commission
report indicates, the Commission reviewed both the problems associated with the current
process, as well as proposals to replace it and concluded that "adjustments in current ar-
rangements are, in fact, both feasible and preferable to more radical reform." COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. It concluded from its analysis that neither trial by the full
Senate nor a constitutional amendment to change the forum of the impeachment process is
a viable alternative to the current process. Id. at 22-26, 53-55. It explained:
A trial committee provides a forum in which a representative number of Senators
evaluate critical evidence, expedite the gathering of evidence for removal pro-
ceedings, and reduce the amount of interference with legislative business caused
by time-consuming proceedings. The question becomes whether the operations
of a Rule XI trial committee can be improved.
Id. at 5.
Even prior to the creation of the Commission, Congress attempted to address some of
the concerns about the trial-by-committee process by enacting the Judicial Councils Re-
form and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) (1988)). Prior to 1980, the only disciplinary
action available for judicial misconduct was criminal conviction or impeachment. See
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1-4 (discussing the institutional role (e.g., peer pres-
sure) that the judicial branch played in the disciplinary process and how that role prompted
Congress to enact the 1980 Act). The Act created a formal supplement to the impeach-
ment process and decreased the burden on Congress, particularly the burden of the House
of Representative to address all claims of misconduct. The committees, however, have no
authority to remove judges. Id. at 166; see also Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Con-
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mission report includes numerous proposals to improve the impeachment
process.' 73 Of the recommendations made with regard to the Senate trial
process, implementation of three proposals is particularly necessary: (1)
to allow issue preclusion; (2) to adopt a standard of proof; and (3) to
create a more rigid appointments process.1 74 These three improvements
would successfully address some of the critics' concerns regarding fairness
and efficiency while protecting the Senate's impeachment authority.
175
The Commission proposal, that the Senate Committee make a recom-
mendation to the full committee on whether to convict, 76 however,
should not be adopted because it is contrary to the framers' original
intent.
177
A. The Senate Trial Committee Should Not Perform Unnecessary and
Duplicative Fact-Finding in the Case of Previously
Convicted Judges
While it is unconstitutional to permit the automatic removal of judges
who are convicted of felonies, 78 it is permissible, even encouraged, that
the Senate trial committee use any facts already collected by a judicial
court in a prior proceeding, particularly if the conviction has been af-
firmed.' 79 The Commission proposes that the entire Senate make a de-
duct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(9) (1988)) (creating a review process for claims of judicial misconduct).
173. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 147-55.
174. See id. at 148-50. While the Commission agrees that issue preclusion and a more
rigid appointments process are essential, it does not support establishing a standard of
proof. Id.
175. See id. at 149-50.
176. Id. at 149.
177. See infra notes 208-18 and accompanying text (addressing whether the trial com-
mittee's recommendation would be contrary to the framers' intent).
178. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (discussing the intention of the
framers to keep the power of impeachment in the hands of the Senate); see also COMMIs-
SION REPORT, supra note 4, at 57 (implying that a constitutional amendment would be
necessary for such automatic removal).
179. Burbank, supra note 84, at 690-91 (suggesting that a guilty verdict should be an
indicator of great persuasive effect); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 57
(finding that a constitutional amendment for automatic removal is undesirable, but that the
Senate rules should allow for issue preclusion). The fact that the district court dismissed
Judge Hastings' claim of double jeopardy supports this argument. Hastings I, 802 F. Supp.
490, 500 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that impeachment is wholly separate from the criminal
trial process). In his suit, Hastings claimed that the impeachment subsequent to an acquit-
tal in criminal court amounted to double jeopardy. Id. Judge Sporkin dismissed this claim.
Id. If the Senate uses issue preclusion, one might wonder whether this is contrary to the
theory that the two procedures are separate, as well as how, in a situation such as Has-
tings', one could be convicted after his criminal acquittal. As Auslander points out, how-
ever, there are few restrictions on permissible evidence in the Senate. Auslander, supra
note 39, at 70 n.10. Thus, the level of evidence permitted in a Senate impeachment trial is
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termination early in its trial proceedings as to which matters are
precluded. 8 ° The use of issue preclusion by the Senate committee would
not jeopardize the "double security" presented by the separation of the
criminal trial and impeachment trial, because a person is convicted in a
criminal court by the strictest standard of proof-beyond a reasonable
doubt."' Conviction by such a standard is sufficient for use in the im-
peachment trial where no evidentiary burden currently is imposed, and
where the potential penalty is far less severe than the loss of liberty.' 82
Adopting issue preclusion would not affect the quality of the factual find-
ings made by the Senate committee, nor would it threaten the Senate's
function in making an independent determination. 183 Issue preclusion
would, however, save the Senate significant time now spent on duplica-
tive fact-finding. 1
84
B. The Senate Should Establish a Permanent Standard of Proof
Although Nixon v. United States held that the Senate is not required to
adopt a standard of proof with respect to the impeachment process, 18 5 the
Senate Rules should, nevertheless, require members to make their indi-
vidual determinations based on a particular standard of proof. 86 Adopt-
ing a standard of proof will encourage each senator, whether a member of
the trial committee or not, to review the provided evidence with enough
much greater than in a criminal trial. Id. Accordingly, a different conclusion in the sepa-
rate courts is conceivable.
180. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 57-58.
181. Id. at 58; see supra notes 88, 179 (discussing the necessary procedural differences
between impeachment trials and criminal trials); see also supra note 116 and accompanying
text (discussing the lower evidentiary burden required in Senate impeachment trials in
comparison to criminal proceedings).
182. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 58; see also CONG. REC. S14,636 (daily
ed. Nov. 3, 1989) (statement of Sen. Levin) (stating that this determination does not con-
versely mean that a not guilty verdict in a criminal case will free a person from an impeach-
ment conviction). The burden to meet for removal from office is less than beyond a
reasonable doubt because the penalty is not as severe as the loss of liberty. Rotunda, supra
note 19, at 719; see infra notes 185-204 and accompanying text (discussing the need to
establish a standard of proof as guidance in the Senate trial process and what that standard
should be).
183. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 58; Burbank, supra note 84, at 691.
184. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 58-59; see Burbank, supra note 84, at 690.
185. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (reviewing the Nixon Court's interpreta-
tion of the term "try").
186. Rotunda, supra note 19, at 719. Rotunda discusses the various degrees of proof
established in the judicial courts, applies those models to the impeachment process, and
determines that the proof needed for the severity of impeachment falls somewhere be-
tween the high standard of proof ,for criminal conviction and the lowest used in civil cases.
Id.
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care to reach an informed determination. 8 7 Moreover, adopting a stan-
dard of proof will safeguard fairness in light of the increasing potential
for future impeachment trials.188 With the increase in the number of Ar-
ticle III judges and in the number of judges that could be subject to im-
peachment proceedings,8 9 it is essential that the Senate has a uniform
and consistent impeachment trial system in place. 190 Although the fram-
ers emphasized the need for flexibility,' 9 ' this need should be balanced
against the need to ensure that two judges tried within a short time of one
another, on similar charges and facts, will meet a similar fate and will not
be subject to excessive political biases.1 92 Establishing a standard of
proof is not a "strict rule" since it does not impinge upon the framers'
intent that each senator should make an independent judgment. Instead,
it simply guides senators in reaching their decisions. 193
Although the adoption of a standard of proof provides considerable
advantages, senators vary in their opinions as to which standard is most
viable.' 94 Some senators support a standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, believing that there is little difference between criminal trials
and the impeachment process and desiring to maintain the separation of
187. At least one former Congressman has opined that Members of Congress currently
give insufficient consideration during the congressional process and stated that the process
is dramatically affected at any given time by the opinions of what a majority of congres-
sional members consider serious enough for impeachment. Maxman, supra note 20, at 444
n.135 (citing 116 CONG. REc. H11913 (1970) (statements of former Rep. Gerald Ford)).
188. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for future
impeachments).
189. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
190. See Maxman, supra note 20, at 422-23,447 (discussing the growth in the number of
judges and the vagueness in the Constitution as to when and why judges may be
impeached).
191. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing the need "of a numerous court" that "can never be tied down by... strict
rules").
192. In fact, the impeachment process was used as a political tool early in this nation's
history. Melton, supra note 8, at 441-44 (recounting the impeachment of Senator Blount, a
Republican, by the Federalist-dominated Congress); Auslander, supra note 39, at 87-88
(stating that the when the Republicans came to dominate, particularly when Thomas Jef-
ferson became President, they also used impeachment against Federalist District Judge
John Pickering and Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase). Such attempts to use impeach-
ment for political purposes should not be repeated and can be avoided, in part, by using a
standard of proof.
193. The National Commission opposes the adoption of a standard of proof stating that
"'any member is entitled to establish the highest, the medium, [or] a lower standard to
govern his or her analysis of the evidence.' " COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 60
(quoting testimony of Senator Strom Thurmond before the National Commission on Judi-
cial Discipline and Removal (May 15, 1992)).
194. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of establish-
ing a standard of proof); see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59-60.
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powers between the branches.195 These arguments fail to recognize, how-
ever, the differences between criminal and impeachment proceedings and
the constitutional importance of keeping these proceedings separate.1
96
Others claim that, because the impeachment process is a political one, the
lower standard of preponderance of the evidence used in civil trials is
sufficient.' 97 Under this standard, however, there is a strong risk that
senators would impose too serious a punishment for some judges whose
guilt is not guaranteed.1 98 Such a risk jeopardizes the high level of quality
of federal officials that the impeachment process was meant to foster.' 99
An intermediate clear and convincing standard provides the most bal-
anced approach for impeachment trials.21° Impeachment trials are a hy-
brid of criminal and civil proceedings,2 °' and, thus, the standard of proof
that the senators use should be a median of the two standards used in
those two proceedings. 20 2 The clear and convincing standard meets this
prerequisite.20 3 Moreover, the peers committee that investigates claims
of judicial conduct uses the clear and convincing standard, prior to rec-
195. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
4, at 59-60; see also Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeach-
ment as the Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1209,
1238 (1991) (noting the Senate's rejection of Judge Claiborne's request for a "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard).
196. See supra notes 88, 179 and accompanying text (discussing differences between
impeachment and criminal trials); see also Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 91 (additionally
noting that "[t]oo rigid a standard might allow [judges] to remain in office even though the
entire Senate was convinced [of his or her guilt]"); BERGER, supra note 74, at 113 (ex-
plaining the framers' intent to maintain two types of trials).
197. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 59; CHARLES L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A
HANDBOOK 17 (1974) (recommending a preponderance of the evidence standard while
also recognizing the importance of the senators' individual judgments).
198. Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 91; see also Rotunda, supra note 19, at 719.
199. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 27 (discussing the framers' intention
that impeachment exist to remove officials from office for wrongdoing).
200. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 60. Proponents of this standard argue
that "[i]t gives force to the purpose of remedying judicial abuse of power, while recogniz-
ing the competing interests of avoiding unjustified removals and protecting judicial inde-
pendence." Id. In fact, many senators applied the clear and convincing standard in the
Hastings trial. Johnston, supra note 115, at Al, A7.
201. Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 90 (establishing that impeachment is "not strictly
either a criminal or a civil proceeding"); see supra note 86 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the separation of criminal trials and impeachments); see also Auslander, supra note 39,
at 70 n.10 (stating that the burden of proof for impeachment trials is not as great as for
criminal trials).
202. Gerhardt, supra note 15, at 90-91.
203. See Rotunda, supra note 19, at 719. The clear and convincing standard is used in
the judicial courts as the intermediate standard between the harshest criminal action and
the lowest civil action. Id.
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ommending the most severe cases to the House of Representatives for
impeachment.2 °4
C. The Senate Trial Committee Should Not Recommend a Verdict to
the Full Senate
Among its recommendations, the National Commission proposes that
each trial committee member transmit individual recommendations to
the full Senate.2 5 The Commission promotes this recommendation as a
method by which all senators can benefit from any effect that hearing
direct testimony may have had on the trial committee members.20 6 Other
proponents of this amendment suggest that a recommendation would
provide "some assurance that decisions as to the conduct of those pro-
ceedings were made by a group large enough to approximate differences
in the Senate as a whole.
20 7
Presenting the entire Senate with a recommendation made by a twelve-
senator committee would negatively impact each senator's ability to
make an individual judgment regarding an accused's guilt or inno-
cence. 20 8 Such an effect would be contrary to the framers' intent.209 The
framers anticipated that the decision to convict an impeached party
would be based on the individual judgment of each senator.210 Requiring
eighty-eight senators to defer to or, at most, consider only the recommen-
dation of twelve senators, rather than the evidence as a whole, would be
contrary to the framers' reason for granting the Senate the right to try
impeached parties.21' In a matter as serious as impeachment, the framers
204. Brooks, supra note 124, at 29. The peers committee acts pursuant to the Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. See supra note 172
(describing the 1980 Act).
205. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 149.
206. Id. at 56.
207. Burbank, supra note 84, at 689. Daniel Luchsinger presents a detailed procedural
process for the recommendation process. See Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 187. It would
"provide for random selection of senators reflecting the partisan representation of the Sen-
ate, require a two-thirds committee majority for a guilty recommendation, require the at-
tendance of a quorum of senators during the trial, and require the full Senate to give
deference to the committee." Id.
208. Rule Xl does not include a recommendation provision because the Senate did not
want the committee to control the full Senate debate. See supra notes 36-46 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the provisions of Rule XI); see also Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 170
n.64.
209. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing the framers' desire that
the process not be limited to the opinions of a small number of people).
210. See supra notes 20-21 (discussing the opinion that senators would serve as in-
dependent and impartial judges).
211. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Alexander Hamilton wrote that no other body of government would be "suffi-
1994]
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would not have viewed as sufficient a decision by each senator that re-
sulted simply from a review of a recommendation made by less than a
quarter of the Senate.212
Some proponents of the Commission's recommendation might argue
that each senator would still be able to make an individual decision,213
and that the recommendation would further inform each senator.214 In
reality, providing a recommendation to today's senators, who are pres-
sured to focus all available time on legislative and other official mat-
ters,215 would provide a perfect excuse not to give the accused's verdict
its deserved consideration.216 The purpose of the trial committee is not
to supersede a full Senate debate or vote.217 Recommendations to the
full Senate are not necessary to ensure that senators make their decisions
based on complete facts.218
D. In the Future, the Senate Must Thoroughly Review Judges During
the Confirmation Process
In addition to its Constitutional authority to try impeachment cases,
the Senate has an additional 'check' over the judiciary-the authority to
confirm judges nominated by the President.219 This authority has become
increasingly important as the size of the judiciary has grown.
220 Due to
the recent increase in the federal judicial body, the confirmation author-
ity is especially significant with regard to judicial appointments. Experts
suggest that there could be 1,000 federal judges by the year 2000.221 As
the National Commission posits, "[i]f even a small percentage of the in-
cumbents were to regularly 'go wrong'-and refuse to leave office until
ciently independent" for the trial authority. Id. In addition, he wrote that there would be
no better "inquisitors" than "the representatives of the nations themselves." Id. at 397.
212. Hamilton's desire that the process be performed by a "numerous court" is evi-
dence of this belief. Id. at 398.
213. It is not clear whether Luchsinger's separate proposal would permit senators to
make their own determinations because the proposed amendment to Rule XI requires
deference to the committee's recommendation. See Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 187-90.
214. Id.
215. See supra note 121 (discussing the number of bills under consideration during the
102d Congress).
216. Unfortunately, this analysis does not cast a positive light on the senators' motiva-
tions, but it is a realistic analysis.
217. Luchsinger, supra note 9, at 170 n.64. The reason for enacting Rule XI was to
provide a more effective method for fact-finding and to provide the full Senate with a fact
report on which they could base their analysis and their vote.
218. Rule XI adequately addresses this concern in its provision that gives the full Sen-
ate the option to rehear or call new witnesses. Rule XI, supra note 2.
219. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
220. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at ii.
221. Id.
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removed by the Senate-might each Congress be processing at least one
judicial impeachment?,
222
The Senate should invoke added care in future judicial confirmations.
This final recommendation obviously would not improve the impeach-
ment process directly, but it would assist in slowing the frequency of im-
peachments. 223 With a carefully administered appointment process,
where only the most qualified judges are selected and confirmed, con-
cerns regarding the impeachment trial process would diminish because
the number of trials would decrease.224 .
IV. CONCLUSION
In correctly deciding that the issues presented in Nixon v. United States
are nonjusticiable, the Supreme Court left the Senate with the monumen-
tal task of judging the fairness of its own impeachment trial proceed-
ings." This task involves a balancing between ensuring that the accused
is given a fair trial, and protecting the framers' original intent that the
impeachment process serve as a 'check' on the judicial branch, as well as
a protector of judicial independence. The Senate trial-by-committee pro-
cess meets this balancing test under the Mathews due process analysis.
The current process does not erroneously jeopardize a judge's right to her
profession. Furthermore, the alternatives to the current process would
create an unduly burdensome result.
Regardless of the current process's efficiency and value, Congress has
responsibly recognized the need to review possible improvements. 2 6 The
final report of the National Commission provides a solid platform from
which to work.227 A more rigid appointment process and the adoption of
issue preclusion are both viable proposals that could reduce the number
of impeachments and increase overall efficiency, respectively. Moreover,
Congress must espouse a standard of proof, whereby a consistent level of
treatment is afforded to all officials threatened with impeachment.
222. Id.
223. This Comment does not delve into the appointments process, except to reveal that
an improved appointments process necessarily affects the impeachment process.
224. Id. at 81.
225. Id. at 51.
226. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5124 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 372(c) (Supp. V 1993) (creating the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and
Removal).
227. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4 (acknowledging the benefits of
the current process and the risks involved with changes requiring constitutional amend-
ments and presenting recommendations for review).
19941
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:243
Ultimately, adhering to such a process will better ensure that the
weights on both sides of the scale of fairness and constitutional intent are
equally balanced.
Jennifer L. Blum
